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I . INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the
effectiveness of the new Department of Defense (DoD) unit
costing procedures as a financial control system. The first
step of the evaluation involves analyzing the present DoD
financial control system and determining the strengths and
weaknesses. The second step involves analyzing the
recommendations from the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved
Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) No. 971, dated
February 1991, using the same framework. Lastly, the new
system will be analyzed to determine if it provides better
information and better tools to managers. The goal is to
enhance the reader's knowledge of the importance and function
of control systems and of basic control system analysis
techniques. The thesis will provide information to Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy makers and field
managers regarding the effectiveness of the changes proposed
in DMRD No. 971. Identification of strengths and weaknesses
in the system will enhance implementation of the new policy.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
"Can the DoD financial management system provide better
information for decision makers and better tools for
managers?" (DOD (C) , 1990, p.l). This is the issue question
posed in Defense Management Report Decision No. 971. The
answer depends on the response to two other questions: 1) What
are the strengths and weaknesses of the current system that
provides information to managers?, and 2) How has the DoD
environment changed such that current information might be
obsolete or ineffective for the managers' use?
One management reform that OSD approved and disseminated
via DMRD No. 971 was the requirement to realign costs with
outputs. The OSD has decided to accomplish this realignment
through unit costing. How effective unit costing will become
depends on how it addresses the issues resulting from the
above two questions. The primary research question of this
thesis is "Why will the recommendations included in DMRD No.
971 lead to better information and to better tools for
managers?" A secondary question is "What are potential
control weaknesses of the new system?"
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROL SYSTEMS
When one thinks of a financial system, images of
accounting ledgers, reports, and reams of computer printouts
may come to mind. However, the DoD financial management
system is a process. The process involves strategic planning,
justification of requirements, and budgeting. The system is
not merely an accounting system; it is a system where planned
requirements become a fiscal reality. In order to get
programs funded, i.e., in order for programs to reach their
fiscal reality, managers must provide not only cost analyses,
but also written justification of the requirements.
1 . Ensure Reliable Flow of Information
Not all of the information managers use is necessarily
numerical. Information for use in the DoD financial
management system can be more than data; it can be information
regarding the quality of service, the timeliness of response,
or the effect a decision may have on the welfare of the
industrial base. All of this information is used by the
manager who needs to justify a requirement or make cost-
benefit decisions.
Managers need to look beyond accounting systems when
looking for a way to provide better management information or
tools. An improved accounting system may provide more
accurate and more technically reliable information. However,
it is important to note that people are an integral part of
the information-passing process. They may have the ability to
change information, withhold information, and to influence the
data to suit their needs. This may happen if the objectives of
the personnel who handle and transfer the information do not
match the objectives of the personnel who require the
information. Management control systems help ensure that the
information that passes both up and down the management
hierarchy is the required information, the information is
accurate, and the information is broadly understood.
2 . Ensure Accomplishment of Desired Actions
Control systems ensure that actions are carried out as
prescribed or that they provide feedback when results are not
within tolerable limits. Control systems accomplish this by
influencing the behavior of people. Control systems should
provide incentives that align the objectives of the individual
and the organization. Therefore, any management system that
deals with providing better information or better management
tools is a management control system. Consequently, in order
to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the current system
it is necessary to analyze it as a management control system,
not as an accounting system.
D. CONTROL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IS DYNAMIC
The suggestion that there might be an alternate method of
providing information or a method of providing alternative
information does not imply that there is anything deficient
with the current control system. One description of the
management control function offered by Robert Anthony (1988,
p. 34) follows:
The purpose of the management control process is to carry
out the strategies arrived at in the strategic planning
process and thereby to attain the organization's goals.
The process involves the interaction of managers with
other members of the organization, including other
managers. Because these personal interactions are a
crucial part of the management control process, behavioral
considerations are important in understanding the process.
By analyzing the present DoD management control system in
light of the above description, one can see that a management
control system might have to change due to a change in
strategy. It also might have to change if the controls did
not increase the probability of attaining the goals (or
objectives) of the organization. In other words, a management
control system is as dynamic as the environment in which it
functions. There is no single system that is suitable for all
organizations or for any organization at all points in time.
Therefore, it should not be surprising that DoD may find it
necessary to periodically reevaluate its various management
control systems.
An effective management system uses controls only where
they are needed and only where they will work. The DoD uses
a variety of mechanisms to influence the behavior of people.
It uses personal supervision, job descriptions, rules,
standard operating procedures, performance appraisals,
budgets, accounting information, and incentive systems. The
way in which managers group these mechanisms determines the
effectiveness of the control system. The use of more control
mechanisms does not necessarily lead to better control. Too
many controls can make employees feel stifled by restricting
their autonomy and/or by making them feel distrusted.
E. THE CHANGING DOD ENVIRONMENT
The latest changes in the DoD environment have been due
largely to three things: 1) the end of the Cold War, 2) the
large deficit, and 3) the perceived mismanagement of DoD funds
in the past. Why are these three things important? First,
many people believe that the end of the Cold War represents a
reduction of any major military threat to the United States.
Some argue that the threat still exists, but one thing is for
certain; there is no longer a need to participate in the rapid
arms build-up, or "Arms Race, " to counter the Soviet Union
arms build-up, as in the 1980' s. Secondly, the budget deficit
is now a household topic and many believe that the deficit is
due to excessive amounts of military expenditures in the past.
Thirdly, when news items reveal acquisition problems resulting
in purchases of inordinately expensive hammers and spare
parts, the public forms a blanket opinion that all DoD funds
must be mismanaged.
1 . Defense Spending Decelerates
How exactly has the DoD environment changed? Because
of the first two items listed above, defense spending will be
decelerating as obligational authority decreases. The defense
budget no longer grows at the rate of inflation each year
because many in the public sector are anxious to see the
"peace dividend." The budget chart below (Figure 1) depicts
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Figure 1 DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY TRENDLINE
2. Public Desires Increased Accountability
Because of the third item, perceived mismanagement of
funds, there is increased pressure to ensure that defense
spending can withstand public scrutiny should anyone charge a
defense activity with waste, fraud, or abuse. Not only does
DoD want to guard against the erosion of public confidence,
but it also needs to ensure the taxpayer that it is executing
its stewardship of public funds in the most efficient and
effective way. It must constantly strive to get the most for
the shrinking defense dollars.
F. A HISTORY OF CONTROL PROBLEMS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The federal government initially addressed the problem of
wasteful spending and poor fiscal management when it enacted
the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (31
U.S.C. 3512 (b) and (c) ) . The act requires department and
agency managers to identify, report, and correct internal
control and accounting system weaknesses that can lead to
fraud, waste, and abuse in government operations. A 1985
Government Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled Financial
Integrity Act: The Government Faces Serious Internal Control
and Accounting Systems Problems , identified eight areas in
which there were weaknesses: 1) the financial management and
accounting systems, 2) procurement, 3) property management, 4)
cash management, 5) grant, loan, and debt collection
management, 6) automated data processing (ADP) , 7) personnel
and organizational management, and 8) eligibility and
entitlement determinations (GAO, 1985, p. 14). GAO emphasized
the need for each agency to develop comprehensive plans of
action to strengthen the areas where there are weaknesses.
Specifically, GAO stressed a plan which should emphasize
1) strengthened accounting, auditing, and reporting, 2)
improved planning and programming, 3) streamlined budgeting,
and 4) systematic measurement of performance. The first and
fourth items are items that are included within a management
control system (GAO, 1985, p. 31). In their 1985 report, GAO
noted that DoD was "having difficulty identifying systematic
8
internal control problems and little testing of accounting
systems had taken place." (GAO, 1985, p. 35)
In GAO' s 1989 report on federal efforts to improve control
and accounting systems, Financial Integrity Act : Inadequate
Controls Result in Ineffective Federal Programs and Billions
in Losses , GAO placed much emphasis on the need for top level
management to be involved in the improvements. Among its
specific recommendations were 1) to link the Financial
Integrity Act internal control review and reporting process to
the budget, and 2) to provide for and promote senior
management involvement in the internal control process (GAO,
1989, p. 5) .
G. UNIQUENESS OF A NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION
Designing or analyzing a control system for use by an
agency of the federal government leads to some peculiar
problems. These make the process distinct from designing or
analyzing a control system in a for-profit agency. There are
many different definitions of nonprofit and not-for-profit
agencies and it would be incorrect to state that the federal
government fits totally into either group. However, the
Anthony and Young definition of a nonprofit organization, from
their book Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations , does
apply to DoD. Their descriptions of characteristics of
nonprofit organizations are useful for this analysis. The
authors conclude that the goal of a nonprofit organization is
usually to provide services to others rather than to provide
profits to its owners. They further state that it is difficult
to measure performance because the "decisions made by
management are intended to result in providing the best
possible service with the available resources; success is
measured primarily by how much service the organizations
provide and by how well the services are rendered." (Anthony
and Young, 1988, p. 50)
As mentioned before, there is no single ideal control
system and the characteristics of each organization determine
its unique system. According to the work of Anthony and
Young, nonprofit organizations generally have particular
characteristics that affect the control process:
1) The absence of a profit measure
2) Different tax and legal considerations
3) A tendency to be service organizations
4) Greater constraints on goals and strategies
5) Less dependence on clients for financial support
6) The dominance of professionals
7) Differences in governance
8) Differences in senior management
9) Importance of political influences
10) A tradition of inadequate management controls.
(Anthony and Young, 1988, p. 54)
Not all of the above characteristics apply to the DoD, but
understanding the consequences of those that do apply is
important when designing or analyzing a control system. The
following characteristics seem to apply to DoD.
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1 . Absence of a Profit Measure
It is difficult for managers to agree on the relative
importance of various objectives when analyzing proposals if
a profit measure does not exist. For example, if the
government is analyzing land use proposals it must rely on
more subjective measures than profit to guide its decision.
Without a profit measure, the other characteristics of a non-
profit organization become dominant factors in the decision-
making process.
Also, there is no accurate way of estimating the
relationship between inputs and ability of the organization to
reach its goal. This makes it difficult to determine what
effect changing the mix of resources, such as number of
employees or pieces of capital equipment, will have on the
efficiency of the organization.
Without profit, performance with respect to goals is
difficult and sometimes impossible to measure. Managers must
then rely on less quantifiable measures, such as customer
satisfaction and timeliness of response, to monitor the
performance of an activity. This leads to another problem:
If an organization has multiple goals and no good way of
measuring performance in attaining these goals, it cannot
delegate important decisions to lower level managers. For
this reason, in government organizations many problems
must be resolved in Washington... rather than in regional
or local offices. The paperwork and related procedures
involved in sending problems to senior management and in
transmitting the decisions on these problems back to the
field can be quite elaborate, and give rise to part of the
criticism that is levied against bureaucracy. Such
criticism is often unwarranted because, in the absence of
11
something corresponding to the profit measure, there is no
feasible way of decentralizing. (Anthony and Young, 1988,
p. 57)
One last problem that arises due to a lack of profit measure
is that there is no way to compare the performance of
divisions that have dissimilar functions. Table I outlines
why the absence of a profit measure is relevant to DoD.
(Anthony and Young, 1988, p. 57)
Table I TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A NON-PROFIT
ORGANIZATION THAT AFFECT THE CONTROL PROCESS
CHARACTERISTIC RELEVANCE TO DOD
No Profit Measure - difficult to measure relative
importance of various objectives when
analyzing proposals
- difficult to estimate the relationship
between inputs and ability of
organization to reach its goals
- difficult to measure performance
toward goals
- difficult to decentralize decision-
making
- difficult to compare the performance
of divisions that have dissimilar
functions
2 . Predominantly Service-Oriented
The problem introduced by producing service related
outputs is that work flow is controlled by client demand
rather than by the pace of machinery, as would be the case in
a production facility. If a service is not used or demanded
12
on a particular day, the potential revenue that the service
would generate is lost.
3. Constraints on Goals and Strategies
Outside forces place many spending constraints on the
DoD . The amount of funds that can be expended on each program
is ultimately approved and appropriated outside of the DoD,
thus limiting the flexibility of management to make various
cost-benefit decisions. DoD must ensure that activities
adhere to spending limits and this is one part of a management
control system that one would not necessarily find in a for-
profit organization. The spending constraints are based on
the fact that the DoD receives its financial support from the
taxpayers through the Congress. The role of Congress is to
represent the public interest when voting on a defense budget.
Consequently, Congress holds the DoD strictly accountable for
the use of the funds.
4. High Concentration of Professionals
Another characteristic that makes nonprofit
organizations different from for-profit organizations is the
concentration of professionals in the management structure.
Universities have professors, hospitals have physicians, and
the DoD has military officers. Control problems appear when
the motivations of the professionals differ from what would be
required for good resource (fiscal) management. A military
officer who is an excellent leader of a ship may not be an
13
excellent leader of a shore support facility. The
professional warfare officer is concerned with and trained for
winning the battle and not necessarily concerned with or
trained for effective fiscal management. However, it is not
unusual to see military warfare officers as commanding
officers of shore establishments, even though a career
civilian might be better suited for the position. Anthony and
Young generalize this control problem with the following:
Professionals tend to give inadequate weight to the
financial implications of their decisions. Many
physicians, for example, feel that no limit should be
placed on the amount spent to save a human life, although
in a world of limited resources such an attitude is
unrealistic. (Anthony and Young, 1988, p. 67)
Similarly, a military officer may think that his assigned
mission should be accomplished at all costs. Although this
may not be true in all cases, it is a control problem which
management must guard against
.
5. Political Influence
All federal government agencies are affected by the
ninth characteristic, political influence. Examples of reasons
why political influences can lead to unique control problems
include the necessity for reelection, public visibility,
pressures from various political action committees and special
interest groups, legislative restrictions, frequent management
turnover, and civil service regulations (Anthony and Young,
1988, p. 71) . Management turnover is particularly significant
because it may motivate managers to concentrate on short-term
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results so they can appear effective at their next performance
reviews. For example, the military officer may be assigned to
a billet for 36 months, but allowing for a learning curve, he
may only effectively occupy the position for 30 months.
Therefore, his prime interest for work performance ratings may
be focused on actions affecting that 30 month period.
6. Tradition of Poor Management Controls
The last characteristic is the tradition of poor
management controls in nonprofit organizations. One reason
for this is that many nonprofit agencies, including the
federal government, concentrate on the obligational concept of
accounting rather than on the accrual concept. A good control
system provides for the transfer of useful information between
managers. With the case of an accounting control system, the
information is primarily numerical. Obligational accounting
provides information regarding resources purchased and accrual
accounting can provide information on the cost of resources
consumed. If there is an emphasis on controlling costs, the
accrual concept may provide the more useful information.
There are also three other explanations as to why the
government lags in good management controls:
First, for many years, there was a prevalent attitude to
the effect that the differences between government and
business were such that government could not use the
management control techniques developed by
business .... Second, the Congress, and particularly the
House Committee on Appropriations, having become
thoroughly accustomed to a certain budget format, is
reluctant to shift to a new format. Because of the
15
importance of the budget, this affects the whole
management control system. ... Third, many career officials
appreciate the fact that a good management control system
is two-edged: it provides new information for outside
agencies - the Office of Management and Budget and the
Congress. Sometimes, these officials are not anxious that
outside agencies have access to the new and better
information. (Anthony and Young, 1988, p. 73)
Table II summarizes the common characteristics of a non-profit
organization and their relevance to DoD management control
system design. Table I summarized the absence of a profit
measure, so this characteristic is omitted from Table II.
H. NEED TO ADDRESS BOTH TECHNICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS
As mentioned previously, for the financial management
system to function well, it is necessary to not only gather
accurate and useful information but also to disseminate
information throughout the management hierarchy without
concern of it being filtered or changed along the way. It can
be said that the gathering of accurate and useful information
is the technical side of the financial
management process while the passing of information to others
is the behavioral side. Similarly, the above ten
characteristics either affect the performance of the
technical or the behavioral side of the system. The absence
of a profit measure affects the technical side and all of the
other characteristics affect the behavioral side.
Improvements can be made to the system so that the
relationship between inputs and outputs can be better
16
TABLE II BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION THAT AFFECT THE CONTROL PROCESS
CHARACTERISTIC RELEVANCE TO DOD
Tendency to be Service
Organizations
- workflow is customer
controlled and output is more
difficult to standardize
Constraints on Goals and
Strategies
Differences in Governance
- limits the flexibility of
managers to make various cost-
benefit decisions
- DoD is not motivated by
market forces
Less Dependence on Clients for
Financial Support





- military professionals may
have motivations that conflict
with good fiscal management
Importance of Political
Influences
- priorities may change due to
political climate or short-term
goals of those in a particular
billet or political office
Tradition of Inadequate
Management Controls
- current accounting system
does measure the cost of all
resources required to provide
an output
Lack of desire to improve
because:
- belief that Congress would
never accept alternate system
- belief that DoD could never
be "business-like"
- DoD management may not want
outside agencies to have access
to cost information
measured; however, no matter how comprehensive the
improvements to the technical side, without improving the
behavioral side, managers can not be certain that the
17
information remains accurate and useful as it passes from
person to person in the workforce.
Behavioral characteristics are significant in two ways.
First, management can overcome the behavioral factors that
impede good management control by understanding them better
and by educating themselves about ways to circumvent' the
problems. Second, unless management is able to overcome the
behavioral problems, improvements in the technical area
(measuring inputs and outputs) are likely to have little
impact on the management control process. (Anthony and Young,
1988, p. 74)
Part of effective control system design involves
understanding how the environment influences the behavior of
people. If the characteristics of the environment, like those
listed above, motivate people to make decisions that are not
congruent with the goals of management, then it is the
function of the control system to offset the environmental
influences
.
II. THE PRESENT SYSTEM
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE FUNDING PROCESS
1 . Appropriations Budgeting System
Currently, most naval shore support activities obtain
funding from the Congress through annual appropriations for
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N), Military Personnel,
Navy (MPN) , and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation,
Navy (RDT&E, N) . These appropriations are considered expense-
type appropriations since they finance the cost of ongoing
operations
.
Budget formulation and execution is the last step in
the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) . It is
an integral part of the strategic planning process since it
provides the link between planning and control. "The
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System can be summarized
in a few words. Based on the anticipated Threat , a Strategy
is developed. Requirements of the strategy are then estimated
and Programs are developed to package and execute the
strategy. Finally the costs of approved programs are
Budgeted . " (Practical Comptrollership , 1990, p.C-3)
During budget formulation, the package of programs to
be included in the final budget is dynamic and changes
according to strategic considerations. Depending on where the
19
perceived threats are in the world, what military requirements
are needed for the national security of the United States, and
economic influences, individual appropriation funding will
increase or decrease. Until the budget execution year,
managers at the activity level cannot be sure how much
operations funding they will be allowed to obligate.
2 . Funding Uncertainties and Competition
Predicting the obligational authority of an activity
is even more uncertain due to the organizational structure of
the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval
Operations have transferred all Navy fiscal responsibility to
the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) . This responsibility
is subsequently delegated to 23 major claimants. Claimants
then pass resources to the Navy field activities for
obligation and expenditure as they each carry out their
respective missions. As funds pass down the hierarchy, there
is some competition for funding between the different
activities at each level. Although activities within the same
claimancy may have similar functions, each activity is
independent of the others. With no profit measure by which to
compare the need of each activity for funds or to determine
where to best spend the funds, the claimancies must make
allocation decisions based on the funding request provided by
each activity.
20
It might be said that the OSD goal for the DoD
financial system is to ensure funds are appropriated for
planned requirements and that the funds are allocated within
the scope of approval and intent of the appropriation process.
Consequently, the goal of the control system should be to
ensure that the above actions occur. Understanding the way in
which the current control system works when funds are
appropriated (including its weaknesses as well as strengths)
will help when analyzing the new system.
3. Key Objectives and Key Actions
The framework that will be used to evaluate the
control system will be one introduced by Kenneth A. Merchant
in his book Control in Business Organizations . According to
Merchant, evaluation of control systems begins with an
understanding of key objectives and key actions. Key
objectives are those things which an organization must achieve
in order to consider itself successful. Key actions, on the
other hand, are those actions which must be carried out to
make the probability of achieving the objectives more likely.
In a multi-level organization like the DoD, each level
may have different key objectives. If the key objectives at
all levels were the same, control problems would not exist and
there would not be a need for a management control system.
The reason that the objectives differ is that every key action
generates a new objective and a new set of actions for the
21
activity responsible for carrying out the original key action.
Top-level management has two choices when faced with the
problem of differing objectives at lower levels. First, it
can try to motivate activities at all levels to have the same
objective. Second, top-level management can use controls to
ensure that whatever the objective is at the lowest level of
activity, the key actions it chooses to take are at least
congruent with the higher level objectives.
Currently, from a financial standpoint, the key
objective for each major claimant is to obtain adequate funds
to meet the planned operational requirements. OSD is also
concerned with obtaining adequate funding from Congress and it
would seem that perhaps the objectives of the activity and OSD
were congruent. However, the scope of this thesis is to
evaluate the control system within DOD . The objective of OSD
for internal financial control is for managers to use funds
efficiently and effectively because it must allocate resources
among many different activities. OSD would like activities
with the greatest need and the best capability to benefit DOD
to receive those funds. However, the activity is concerned
with not only receiving enough funding for planned
requirements but also with using it in such a way that it
increases the probability of receiving adequate funding in the
next budget cycle. The activity is therefore primarily
concerned with obligating all available funds. If there is
any excess at the end of the year, headquarters may take it
22
back (recoup it) . This could lead to a reduction in funding
for the next year if headquarters perceives that the activity
either overstated requirements or overstated costs. A control
system is therefore necessary because of the differing
objectives between OSD and the activity level commands.
The activity must also obligate funds within certain
legal constraints. Because of the requirement to remain
accountable for the use of public funds, there are regulations
that restrict the use of DoD funds. Because there is
legislation preventing the use of funds in an unauthorized
manner, the primary motivator here is the avoidance of a fine
or federal prison sentence. However, if there were no
legislation, misuse of funds would lead to a loss of activity
credibility by headquarters top management, and the real
potential of reduced funding for the future. It is critical
for the activity comptroller to accomplish the following key
actions since they are the only financial resource for the
major claimant:
obtain through the budget formulation process,
sufficient funding required to support the assigned
missions and objectives
- once funding is obtained, use financial resources
efficiently and effectively to preclude recoupment by
higher authority
- use funds properly, consistent with legal constraints.
(Practical Comptrollership , 19 90, p.A-5)
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B. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
1. Purpose of Analysis
The results of a feasibility analysis indicate the
ideal control system to be used by an organization with
certain key actions. Managers can still benefit from
conducting a control feasibility analysis even if there is a
control system already in place because the analysis will help
indicate where managers can make improvements to the system.
In other words, since managers already know the key actions
and they know how difficult it is to measure performance, it
is possible to determine which types of controls are feasible
(or most appropriate) for each action. The feasible controls
can be compared to the actual controls that are currently in
place. This comparison should identify the existence of any
"gaps" or misplaced controls. These "gaps" or misplaced
controls may cause dysfunctional behavior.
2. Description of Controls
Merchant proposes that management can either establish
control through control-problem avoidance or through
implementation of control tactics. Control-problem avoidance
is the most indirect form of control. Management can achieve
control-problem avoidance in three ways: elimination,
automation, or risk sharing. Elimination means that
management decides to eliminate the particular action from its
business through such mechanisms as subcontracts, licensing
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agreements, and/or divestment. Automation includes the use of
computers and robots. Risk sharing is a form of partial
avoidance. "Sharing risks with outside activities can bound
the losses (or foregone opportunities) that could be incurred
by inappropriate employee behaviors." (Merchant, 1985, p. 10)
Buying insurance and participating in joint ventures are
methods of risk sharing.
Managers need to note that with elimination and risk
sharing, not only do the control problems leave the
organization, but the organization also loses control over the
actions. If the actions are important in determining the
future of the organization, then it would be more desirable to
maintain control and to deal with the control problems.
However, automating a task or action does not mean that the
organization loses control over the action. Instead, it just
reduces exposure to control problems.
Control tactics are classified according to what
object they seek to control: specific actions, results, or
personnel. Table III, "A Control Classification Framework,"
summarizes the various controls.
a. Actions Controls
Action controls are the most direct form of
controls. They "are used to ensure that individuals perform
(or do not perform) certain actions that are known to be
beneficial (or harmful) to the organization." (Merchant, 1985,
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Table III A CONTROL CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK
Object of Control
Specific Actions Results Personnel
Behavioral Constraint Results Account- Upgrade Capabilities
- Physical ability - Selection
- Administrative - Standards - Training
- Budgets - Assignment
Action Accountability - Mgmt . by Objec-
- Work Rules tive Improve
- Policies and Pro- Communication
cedures - Clarify Expecta-
tions
Preaction Review - Provide Informa-
- Direct Supervi- tion
sion
- Approval limits Encourage Peer Con-
- Budget Reviews trol
- Work Groups
- Shared Goals
p. 29) Merchant describes four actions controls: behavioral
constraint, action accountability, preaction review, and
redundancy. Action controls are ideal for the situation where
things need to be done right the first time and for jobs that
are highly routinized. However, there are a number of
disadvantages. For example, "most people react to action
controls by developing their habits around following the
rules, and this adaptation may be so complete that they begin
to depend on the rules, cease to think how the processes could
be improved, and become very resistant to change." (Merchant,
1985, p. 128) Also, some people do not like working in an
environment where there is a high degree of action controls




Another disadvantage occurs where action controls
are used to control professionals. Because management
requires that people who evaluate actions are as well, or
more, qualified than the person conducting the action, action
controls can become expensive when professionals monitor
professionals
.
Behavioral constraints exist in two forms:
physical and administrative. Two types of administrative
control are centralization and the separation of duties. One
example of centralization in the DoD is the existence of a
comptroller department at the lowest levels of an activity.
Financial decisions are usually the product of this
department. Since the comptroller is responsible to the
commanding officer, this precludes subjecting the comptroller
to undue influence as would be the case if he were subordinate
to a department head. Separation of duties involves "dividing
up the tasks necessary for the accomplishment of certain
sensitive duties." (Merchant, 1985, p. 30) For example, a good
action control using the separation of duties concept would be
to separate record keeping and report generating functions
where it would be undesirable for one person to have access to
both the inputs and outputs of the reporting function. This
allows for a "checks and balances" system that can catch




Management achieves action accountability through
the use of work rules, policies, and procedures. For example,
DoD issues guidelines for how statistics should be grouped for
reports. For this action control to work, evaluation of the
command performance should be directly related to their
observance of the guidelines and policies. The advantage of
this type of control is that it helps with organizational
coordination
.
They increase the predictability of actions and reduce the
amount of interorganizational information flows required
to achieve a coordinated effort. They are a key element
in a bureaucratic form of organization (using this term in
a positive sense) which makes the organization capable of
attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this
the most rational known means of carrying out the
imperative of control over human beings. (Merchant, 1985,
p. 128)
Preaction reviews "involve observing the work or
plans of the individuals being controlled before the activity
is complete and making adjustments as necessary." (Merchant,
1985, p. 31) Currently, activities can accomplish this by
analyzing expenditure rates before the end of the quarter or
the attainment of a formal review period and either
recommending accelerating or decelerating obligations and
expenditures to keep on target with the budget objective.
Preaction reviews can be formal or informal. The typical
formal review is the requirement for upper-management to
specifically approve the amount of expenditures to be executed
in the coming months/quarters. Informal reviews can be as
basic as a supervisor walking around the office and discussing
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obligational progress and status with his subordinates. Not
only do preaction reviews prevent mistakes from occurring, but
often just the knowledge of a possible formal/informal review
occurring will cause an employee to take extra care in
performing his duties.
Redundancy involves assigning more people to do a
task than is necessary. Redundancy can also mean having a
back-up system. This type of control can be expensive but it
is common in installations dependent upon computer output or
critical operations.
b. Results Controls
Results control "involves rewarding individuals (or
otherwise holding them accountable) for accomplishing
particular results or outcomes." (Merchant, 1985, p. 17)
According to Merchant, management mast take three steps in
order to implement results control. First, management must
define the dimensions on which results are desired. Second,
management must devise a way in which they can measure
performance on these dimensions. Third, management must
provide rewards in order to encourage the specific behavior
that will lead to the desired results.
Results control is useful in many situations in
organizations because most jobs are not highly routinized.
Results controls also allow the autonomy of personnel even
though management is controlling their behavior. Since
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management is measuring results, personnel have latitude in
the actions they choose to take in arriving at the desired
results. One other advantage is that results control can be
inexpensive. "Performance measures are often collected for
reasons not directly related to management control, such as
for financial reporting, tax reporting, or strategy
formulation, and if these measures can be used or easily
adapted for results control use, the incremental expense of
the control can be relatively small." (Merchant, 1985, p. 129)
One disadvantage of results control is that it can
be difficult to find the right measurements of performance.
Ideally, the way in which results are measured will indicate
if personnel acted in a way that was congruent with the
overall objectives of the organization. It is also necessary
to be careful to ensure that the results measurements are
based on factors over which the personnel have influence. The
other main disadvantage is that when results targets are used,
the targets can not be used for both motivating and
communication. A plan is a type of communication because it
informs others in the organization what to expect for the
division or department. Thus, the targets in the plans can
not be used for motivation. The target used for motivation
should be slightly conservative so that the division has a
reasonable chance at attaining it. Management must sacrifice
one of the purposes if results control is used.
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c. Personnel Controls
Personnel controls involve encouraging and
facilitating desirable behaviors. Merchant proposes that two
basic forces guide human behavior: individual self-control,
which is naturally present in each person; and social control,
which basically refers to peer pressure and the reaction of an
individual to it. Merchant describes personnel controls in the
following manner:
Often individuals do, by themselves, what is best for
the organization because they are self-directed or
because they are influenced by social (group)
pressure. Most managers rely on these positive,
naturally occurring forces to some extent, and they
also take steps to increase the chances that these
forces are present and/or that they will produce the
appropriate actions. These management actions can be
called personnel controls . (Merchant, 1985, p. 39)
Management tries to augment these forces in three ways: by
upgrading capabilities, improving communications, and
encouraging peer control. It is generally inexpensive to
implement personnel controls and there are rarely any
dysfunctional side effects.
Personnel controls are generally not sufficient to
be used by themselves. It is seldom that management would be
willing to rely solely on personnel controls without any
other system of check and balances. Personnel controls are
most likely to work in the small business environment where
top management has more control over personnel selection. In
a large organization, like the DoD, such a control system
would not work even if there were poor knowledge of the steps
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involved to accomplish the key action and low ability to
measure the successful accomplishment of the key action (the
situation where personnel controls are ideal)
.
3 . Primary Control for Each Action
Using the control object feasibility matrix (Table
IV)
,
one can determine which type of control would be most
appropriate for each of the key actions. Control choice
decisions are complex, but determining which type of control
to emphasize is a good starting point. There are two main
questions to ask when choosing appropriate controls for each
action: (1) "Is there knowledge of the steps required to
complete the action?" and (2) "Is there an ability to measure
the success of the action?"
Table IV CONTROL OBJECT FEASIBILITY DETERMINANTS
Key Control Object Feasibility Determinants





















a. Key Action #1 : Obtaining Funding
Looking at the first key action, obtaining funding
through the budget formulation process, there is knowledge of
the steps involved to complete the action. In order to make
an objective feasibility analysis, it is important to look at
the actions in isolation from the environment that is familiar
to those officers and civilians who work in the financial
field. Therefore, ignoring for the time being the reports
that must be submitted (because they are a type of control)
,
at the most basic level the primary step involved is the
communication of needs by the activity to the major claimant.
The activity should be able to communicate their needs at the
annual budget call. The activity should also be able to
communicate their needs throughout the year on a timely basis
whenever there may be extra funds available to allocate or
there is an action to reduce available funding.
Measuring the success of the action is low because
there is not a direct correlation between correct
accomplishment of the above steps and the receipt of a budget
that meets all of the stated requirements of the activity.
Preparing a "good" budget request certainly does not decrease
the chances of receiving the funds requested. However, if an
activity does not receive all funds requested it does not mean
that the comptroller did a poor job of preparing the request.
If the overall budget climate is one of "tightening the belt,"
then actual Total Obligation Authority received by the
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Department of the Navy (DON) may be less than expected. On
the other hand, an activity may receive more than was budgeted
if their type of mission responsibility receives a lot of
attention in Congress due to world affairs, national security
issues, or economic conditions.
b. Key Action #2: Using Resources to Preclude
Recoupment
The steps are less defined with the second key
action, using financial resources in a manner as to preclude
recoupment. The goal is to ensure that there are no
unoligated funds remaining at year-end that higher
headquarters could recoup. The steps involved start from the
very basic preparation of the requisition, to establishing an
obligation, to receiving material, service, or canceling the
request, to paying the bill, and finally to recording the
expenditure. These transactions must all be performed
accurately in order to accomplish the second key action, but
personnel must make many decisions as they carry out the steps
and it is not possible to routinize this type of action.
Success in accomplishing the second key action,
using financial resources so as to preclude recoupment, can be
measured by a number of indicators. Basic accounting reports
are available within the DoD financial community to compare
planned verses actual expenditures. But the reports are a
form of control. For a feasibility analysis it is important
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to separate preconceived ideas of how things work from the way
things could work. What is important to note here is that
there is an ability to determine the success of the execution
phase because managers know what the numbers should be for
excellent performance.
c. Key Action #3: Using Funds Properly
The steps involved to accomplish the third key
action, using funds properly, are well-defined. Activities
can only use funds for their designated purpose, total
obligations for each appropriation must be within a set dollar
limit, and the funds should be obligated before they expire.
Measuring the success of the third step is possible
because managers can look at end of year figures to determine
if the funds were obligated on time and within funding limits.
It is more difficult to determine if funds were obligated for
the correct purpose. What may be important later in the
analysis, however, is the timeliness of measuring the results.
If there is an overobligation, the violation has already
occurred by the end of the fiscal year. Finding
overobligations in the end of the year figures severely limits
the ability of management to correct the situation. It is a
fact which must be reviewed for corrective action and the
citing of specific responsibility.
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4 . Supplemental Controls for Each Action
According to the matrix (Table IV)
, the primary
emphasis should be on action controls for the first key action
where there is high awareness of the steps required and low
ability to measure the results. For the second key action
there is limited knowledge of the steps involved and high
ability to measure results. For this action, management
should emphasize results control . For the third key action,
where there is sufficient understanding of the steps involved
and there is a high ability to measure results, one can use
specific-action and/or results control. The results of the
first step of the feasibility analysis indicate which controls
should receive primary emphasis for control of each key
action. It is important to realize, however, that Table IV is
just a tool to help with finding where management should place
their emphasis. A good control system will use different
types of control to supplement the efforts of management on
each key action. Well-designed multiple controls provide
better results because of their ability to reinforce each
other and their ability to address a broader set of problems.
However, one disadvantage of multiple controls may be cost.
Management would have to weigh the benefits of multiple
controls with the costs of implementing them before reaching
a conclusion on the final design of the control system.
The next step of the feasibility analysis will be to
find out which supplemental controls would be useful for each
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key action. Then, the information derived from the
feasibility analysis (which would be the same information that
one would use in designing a control system) will be used to
evaluate the existing control system.
The decision tree in Figure II from Merchant (1985,
p. 48) outlines the entire feasibility analysis process and
will be used to complete the analysis. Thus far, the
feasibility analysis indicates that the key actions should be
matched with the primary controls as indicated in Table V.
Table V KEY ACTIONS AND RESPESCTIVE PRIMARY CONTROLS
KEY ACTION PRIMARY CONTROL
Key Action #1: Obtain funding Action Controls
Key Action #2: Use of Funds to
Preclude Recoupment
Results Control
Key Action #3: Using Funds
Properly
Action and/or Results Control
The first question in the second step of the
feasibility analysis asks: "Is there a capability to avoid
reliance on other people?" Because all three key actions are
important in determining the future of the organization, when
considering control problem avoidance DoD managers should
consider automation. For example, computers can do many tasks
faster and with fewer mistakes than a human can do them.
Consequently, control problem avoidance through automation
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Figure 2 QUESTIONS TO DETERMINE FEASIBILITY OF CONTROL
TYPES
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would be a good control for actions that involve manipulation
of numbers and generation of reports. Automation also has the
advantage of reinforcing specific-actions control through the
behavioral constraint. If a worker is assigned the duty of
data input and the computer generates the reports (and no one
is allowed to manipulate the reports) then management has
achieved the separation of duties control.
The second and the third questions in the second step
of the feasibility analysis are "Can you rely on the people
involved?" and, "Is there a capability to make people
reliable?" These are all ways that help make people more
reliable. In the DoD environment, the answer to the question
"Is there a capability to make people more reliable?" is
usually "yes" in the long run. In the short run, unless
management is able to control selection and placement (which
is difficult in the DoD environment) , it is more difficult to
make people reliable. Tables VI, VII, and VIII indicate the
results of the feasibility analysis.
C. CONTROL SYSTEM ANALYSIS
The purpose of this section is to compare the current
control system with the most appropriate system as described
in the feasibility analysis. Similarities between the two
systems will indicate the strengths of the present system and
dissimilarities may indicate weaknesses.
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Table VI FEASIBILITY OF CONTROL ALTERNATIVES FOR
KEY ACTION #2 - USING RESOURCES TO PRECLUDE
RECOUPMENT
I. Able to avoid reliance Yes, for Partial automation
on other people? reports feasible.
II. Able to rely on other No Personnel controls
people? feasible for long-run
benefits.




III. Have knowledge as to Yes Action controls not
what actions are feasible.
desirable?
Able to ensure that No
desirable actions are
taken?
IV. Have knowledge as to Yes Results control




Able to measure Yes
results effectively?
1. Personnel Controls for All Actions
All of the key actions called for personnel controls
as supplemental controls. The DoD incorporates personnel
controls into financial systems by using position descriptions
(PDs) for civilian personnel and adding special
experience/training requirement codes to military billets.
PDs are mandatory for all federal civilian positions and they
document the specific skilles the employee must possess.
Since PDs indirectly ensure employees will have a basic level
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Table VII FEASIBILITY OF CONTROL ALTERNATIVES FOR
KEY ACTION #1 - OBTAINING FUNDING
I. Able to avoid reliance Yes, for Partial automation
on other people? reports feasible.
II. Able to rely on other No Personnel controls
people? feasible for long-run
benefits
.




III. Have knowledge as to Yes Action controls not
what actions are feasible.
desirable?
Able to ensure that NO
desirable actions are
taken?
IV. Have knowledge as to Yes Results control




Able to measure Yes
results effectively?
of competence and also describe specific duties of the
employee, they directly contribute to goal congruence.
Coding of military billets is a less reliable
mechanism, as military personnel assignments are the product
of a 'best fit' process. A "coded" military billet is one
which is designated as requiring a person possessing certain
skills or training. Difficulties arise in matching coded
billet vacancies with the pool of service members available
for assignment. Sometimes it is necessary to fill coded
positions with personnel who do not have the recommended
training. This accentuates the problem of having
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Table VIII FEASIBILITY OF CONTROL ALTERNATIVES FOR
KEY ACTION #3 - USING FUNDS PROPERLY
I. Able to avoid reliance Yes, for Partial automation
on other people? reports feasible.
II. Able to rely on other No Personnel controls
people? feasible for long-run
benefits.




III. Have knowledge as to Yes Action controls
what actions are feasible.
desirable?
Able to ensure that Yes
desirable actions are
taken?
IV. Have knowledge as to Yes Results control may




Able to measure Yes, but may
results effectively? not be
timely.
professionals in the organization who may not have had the
same training as their colleagues. Therefore, they may
adversely affect goal congruency.
Training, both formal and on-the-job (OJT) , is another
facet of personnel controls. Formal training includes general
budget and accounting courses offered to all federal employees
(military and civilian) . In addition, the military services
offer DoD-targeted courses. Employees who work in the
financial management arena get OJT through daily experience
and formal, scheduled command/claimancy training. Training
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contributes significantly to personnel controls as it upgrades
employee capabilities and increases communications. This
leads to increased understanding, which directly enhances goal
congruence. (Merchant, 1982, p. 45)
The personnel controls currently in place provide
strong control for the long-term. Training and position
descriptions help the organization successfully accomplish all
three key actions by promoting goal congruency. Personnel
controls are also important in the DoD organization because
the budget process is dynamic and constant changes place
employees on a perpetual learning curve
.
2 . Controls for Key Action #1
For the first key action, obtaining sufficient funds,
the feasibility analysis indicated that the primary control
should be actions control. The Navy uses both action
accountability and preaction reviews. Action accountability
controls hold people responsible for their actions and
require: 1) defining what is (is not) acceptable, 2) tracking
of what actually happens, and 3) rewarding or punishing
deviations from the defined limits. (Merchant, 1985, p. 31)
However, this system only works if employees understand what
is required of them and feel their actions will be
significantly rewarded or punished. (Merchant, 1982, p. 45)
For example, NAVCOMPT defined a broad set of budget
guidelines for use in the preparation of Navy budgets. Major
43
claimants further customize these work rules for their
subordinate field activities. Activities are expected to
follow the directions of the claimant in the development of
their budgets. Compliance is easily seen when the claimant
receives the activity budget submission.
Major claimants also conduct preaction reviews of the
budget requests for correctness and compliance whenever they
desire to do a program review. This consolidation and review
process occurs at each subsequent level in the DoD until the
product is submitted to the OSD Comptroller for processing.
3. Controls for Key Action #2
The primary control for the second key action, use of
funds to preclude recoupment, is results control. The Navy
uses results accountability, in this case, standards or
budgets, to control this action. Field activities commit to
their execution plans when they provide the claimant with the
quarterly/monthly execution profile included in their budget
submission. This plan delineates the fund phasing required by
the activity to effectively execute the funded mission
requirements. The claimant then requests that NAVCOMPT mesh
subsquent funding to support the subordinate execution plans.
The execution plans become an unofficial contract on how the
budget will be executed between the activity and the major
claimant, and the claimant and NAVCOMPT.
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This can be an effective control because "a budget
prepared at the level at which it is to be implemented is more
likely to evoke commitment than one imposed from on high."
(Churchill, July-August 1977, p. 6) Failure to follow the
phasing plan or failure to obligate funds in a timely manner
may imply that the activity is over-funded and can afford to
absorb a budget cut.
4. Controls for Key Action #3
The best controls to use for the third key action, use
funds properly and legally, could be either actions controls
or results controls, although actions controls would be more
feasible because of the lack of timeliness in measuring
results. Behavioral constraints are the primary control DoD
uses for this action. Legislation 10 U.S.C. Titles 1301 and
1517 place extremely stringent behavioral constraints on the
field activities or any government agency having use of
federal funds. The law prohibits use of funds for purposes
other than specified in the appropriation; it also prohibits
the over-obligation of funds. Over-obligation is the act of
obligating more funds than approved and appropriated.
Results accountability also helps ensure the
accomplishment of the third key action. Congress and DoD
provide fiscal guidance for the services beyond what is
written in the budget appropriations. For example, Congress
designates a minimum or maximum amount of an appropriation to
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be used for a specific purpose. These amounts are called
"ceilings" or "floors" and they apply to certain areas such as
civilian personnel and real property maintenance.
5. Beware of Behavioral Displacement
In general, the control system seems to match the
appropriate controls with each key action. However, there is
at least one weakness and that is a result of a negative side
effect due to the control of the second key action. By using
results accountability as a control it may produce a negative
side effect called "behavioral displacement." This is most
common with accountability-type controls. Displacement "occurs
whenever the behaviors encouraged by the control system are
not consistent with the organization's objectives." (Merchant,
1985, p. 72) The objective of DoD is for the activity to use
their funds efficiently and effectively and in ensuring the
funds are all obligated by the end of the year. One DoD
concern is that if, consistently, there are funds left
unobligated, then Congress may suspect the DoD is "padding"
its budget request in anticipation of budget cuts. Therefore,
DoD applies a control to discourage unobligated funds. If
there are funds left at the end of the year, DoD recoups the
funds for higher priority items and may decrease the budget of
the under-obligated activity in a future year.
The outcome of results accountability is that it
motivates the activity to obligate all of its funds so it can
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get more the following year. At the end of the year, the
motivation to "use or lose" all of the funds may dominate the
motivation to obligate funds efficiently and effectively. For
example, even though it might be more prudent for the activity
to request more estimates from vendors, or to examine
alternatives, the activity might simply obligate the funds to
increase the chances of receiving the budget requested the
next year.
The behavioral displacement is not as significant
during times of overall DoD budget growth as it would be
during times of shrinking budgets. When the budget is
growing, OSD is still able to attain its higher objective of
obtaining adequate funds from Congress even if, internally,
the funds are not allocated most efficiently and effectively.
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III. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
A. NEW KEY OBJECTIVE
Both top level management and lower level activity
comptrollers could achieve their objectives while the budget
was growing. While the objectives may not have been
congruent, there was enough funding available that it may have
seemed that both objectives were met. There were enough
funds to cover the planned requirements of the activities even
though OSD was trying to achieve effective and efficient
allocation. However, with the shrinking budget, DoD should
become increasingly concerned with how efficiently funds are
used and less concerned about using them up. The new defense
environment has made the objectivies of OSD and the activity
incongruent . Because of the changes in the DoD environment
described earlier, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has
directed through the DMRD process specific actions which are
designed to reduce the cost of doing business. This same key
objective is required of all support activities. The Unit
Cost Resourcing Guidance states that the "...goal of each
support activity, as part of DoD should be to reduce what it
costs to do its job, and thus to reduce its budget."
Because the objective of the organization has changed, the
control system should also change. If DoD tries to reach the
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new objective using the old control system, there may be
dysfunctional side-effects since the wrong behaviors are
encouraged. For example, DoD would find it difficult to
motivate managers to reduce costs if the control system
influences managers to concentrate on obligating all available
funds. The emphasis under the old system was on executing
while the emphasis under the new system should be on "saving"
or reducing costs.
B. NEW KEY ACTIONS
In order to evaluate the control system, managers must be
aware of not only the new key objective, but also of the new
key actions most likely to lead to cost reductions. Two
reasonable key actions would seem to be 1) improve operational
efficiency, and 2) make cost-cutting decisions. Ensuring that
these two actions get accomplished is the purpose of the
control system.
1 . Improve Operational Efficiency
The steps involved with improving operational
efficiency are varied and can be highly complex. It is
difficult to pinpoint which actions are most desirable.
Therefore, actions control is not the most feasible type of
control to use for this action. However, it is more likely
that managers would be able to determine whether or not the
action was accomplished successfully. Consequently, results
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control would be the most feasible type of control to use for
this action.
a. Results Control
Results control is only effective when results can
be measured in a meaningful manner. DoD has chosen to use the
unit cost as a measurement for results control (DOD (C) , 1990)
.
A unit cost is derived by dividing the total cost required to
provide a certain function by the number of units provided.
For example, if the function of an activity is to issue spare
parts, then the unit cost is the total cost required to
provide the spare parts divided by the number of spare parts
issued.
One purpose for evaluating a unit cost is to
"assist managers by giving them a tool that will allow them to
identify target areas for improvement and measure the improved
efficiency of their operation." ( Unit Cost Resourcing
Guidance , p . 5) According to the Guidance, a unit cost for each
activity would, in turn, be converted into many unit costs
each covering a separate work area. These secondary unit costs
would correspond to lower level outputs which contribute to
the primary output. As each activity would be given a goal by
which its unit cost should be reduced, the activity would





Use of personnel controls, if used effectively,
will help smooth the transition from the old system to the new
system. Training provides information about what tasks are
required and how they can be performed. An employee who
understands what is required of him may be more interested in
doing the job well. Group based awards, such as profit-
sharing, also help communicate to employees what is required
of them and provide incentives for the employees to work
toward the objective of the activity.
2. Make Cost-Cutting Decisions
As for the second key action, make cost-cutting
decisions, the steps involved are also varied. This indicates
that actions control may not be the most suitable control for
this action either. However, the successful accomplishment of
this action may be even more difficult to measure. For
example, if an activity requires a new warehouse facility
because the existing one has deteriorated beyond repair, the
choice may be either to construct warehouse A or warehouse B.
The goal here is not to reduce costs because, chances are,
the cost of any new warehouse will increase unit costs.
However, the goal is to make the least costly decision.
Measurement of results will not tell top-level managers if the
activity made a cost-effective decision. If they build
warehouse B and costs increase, then management does not know
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whether they made a poor choice or a good choice (if warehouse
A would have been even more expensive) . Therefore, actions
controls, like preaction reviews, may be the most feasible
control choice.
a. Preaction Reviews
Unit costs will be used for preaction reviews. For
example, unit cost data will provide information to the
manager regarding the total cost to carry out a project before
the project is actually approved. Unit costs will also
identify functions that contribute little to the final project
yet carry a disproportionate cost. Providing visibility to
"cost drivers" helps managers make day-to-day resourcing and
managing decisions.
b. Personnel Controls
The same personnel controls used to control the
first key action would also apply here. Training and group-
based awards would be the most feasible controls to use to
ensure goal congruency.
C. WEAKNESSES IN THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
OSD differentiates between those activities that will
participate in the Defense Base Operations Fund and those that
will not participate based on how closely the activity
operates like a for-profit organization. In particular, the
approved DMRD 971 specifies that only the activities that
satisfy the following three requirements will be included.
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First, the activity must be able to identify the outputs of
their business. Second/ the activity must have a cost
accounting system that relates their costs to those outputs.
Third, the activity must be able to identify its customers.
Unit costing satisfies the second requirement.
Even though an activity may be nonprofit, if it satisfies
the three requirements needed to participate in the Fund, then
some of the characteristics of a nonprofit organization no
longer apply. In particular, three of the ten characteristics
of a nonprofit agency that make it difficult to design a
control system may not apply to Defense Business Operations
Fund-eligible activites. Establishing a unit cost for
measuring business operations is the first step in
establishing a profit measure. Since the activities in the
Fund would no longer receive annual funding from Headquarters,
they will have to rely on financial revenues from their
customers. Also, by requiring those activities in the Fund to
have an identifiable and quantifiable output, OSD has removed
some of the problems inherent to control system design of
service activities that do not have a quantifiable output.
However, in order to design a control system, the manager
needs to evaluate both the technical and behavioral
characteristics of the organization. Establishing a unit Cost
to relate inputs to outputs does not necessarily make an
organization "business-like." If the behavioral
characteristics of a nonprofit organization dominate any
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technical changes, then the technical changes can not be used
to their full advantage.
1 . Managers Bound by Constraints
Constraints that restrict the behavior of managers and
employees affect the ability of result controls to work
effectively. Managers must have control over the elements
that contribute to the results measure (the unit cost) . If
they do not have control, then the managers will become
frustrated and not support the system. "Activities must still
be responsive to corporate policy, even if that policy
increases the unit cost." (Unit Cost Resourcing Guidance , p. 2)
For example, if legislation requires that DoD purchase from
small, disadvantaged businesses, even if it were possible to
purchase the same part elsewhere at a reduced cost, then the
activity is constrained from achieving the lowest possible
unit-cost. Other examples include lack of control over the
structure of the workforce and lack of control over the
disposal of slack resources such as unused buildings and
excess inventory.
One other constraint is that activity managers do not
have control over the number of customers they must service.
This is particularly important because with a typical U-shaped
average total cost curve, unit costs are sensitive to the
number of customers (or level of output) . Managers cannot
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determine their ultimate unit costs if they cannot control the
level of output.
The Unit Costing Guidance addresses this issue by
stating that " [T]he cost goals assigned to cost center
managers should reflect only those costs within their
control." However, because of the nature of the DoD
environment and the number of constraints that do exist, the
unit cost goals may not be applicable to very many functions.
Unit-costs may be assigned, but a performance measure such as
"achieving a unit-cost goal" would not be effective as a
results control for the first key action, improve operational
efficiency. This is because managers would not have control
over all of the elements that contribute to unit cost.
2. Activities May Aim for Short-Term Results
Professionals dominate the DoD top-level management
and they are often looking for ways to improve their short-
term performance in order to move up to the next position.
Thus, DoD employees are familiar with the importance of
achieving short-term results. Artificially generated short-
term results can be achieved through gamesmanship.
Gamesmanship is a side effect of some types of controls. Two
types of gamesmanship are the creation of slack resources and
data manipulation. Both are common side effects of
accountability types of controls. (Merchant, 1985, p. 78)
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Slack resources refer to assets that an activity does
not need to perform a function, yet the activity says that
they do need them. This provides a safety margin to protect
the activity in the short-term future. For example, if
employees perceive that unit-costing is going to be a short-
lived management trend, they may "pad" their initial cost
calculations. They could accomplish this by including extra
employees, hours, or facility space into the total cost
calculation. As top-level management demanded improvement
each period, the activity could comply by merely reducing the
reserve of slack resources. It would appear that the activity
was improving its operational efficiency, but it would not be
accurate. This could not continue forever, because the
activity will have exhausted its slack resources at some
point. Top-level managers should be aware of this and not
place too much emphasis on information provided at the
beginning of the transition process, but, instead, place more
value on improvements made in the long-term.
Data manipulation involves making an activity "'look
good' by fudging the control indicators, and it comes in two
basic forms: falsification and smoothing." (Merchant, p. 79)
Falsification means providing false data while smoothing
refers to reporting things, either results or actions, in the
incorrect time period. Smoothing may be particularly
applicable to this system because management is looking for a
downward trend in unit-cost figures. Smoothing literally
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helps "smooth" the trendline. If an activity legitimately
achieves a twenty percent decrease in one year, but knows that
top management would be satisfied with a ten percent decrease,
then the incentive might be to report a ten percent decrease
the first period and withhold the second ten percent for the
next reporting period.
3. Too Many Uses for Unit Cost
DoD wants activity managers to be realistic when
calculating unit costs for aid in making day-to-day cost-
cutting decisions. However, if those same unit cost figures
are used for results control, managers have an incentive to
overstate the unit costs (or total costs) in their planning
figures. Preaction reviews of how managers arrived at their
planning figures will help reduce this problem. However, it
is much more difficult and time-consuming to evaluate how well
a manager did at correlating planning figures than it is to
evaluate performance based on a results control figure.
Managers may know this also and concentrate on trying to
reduce the unit-cost figures rather than improving their cost-
cutting decision-making skills.
4. Does Not Address Accountability Issues
Another goal (or it might be called a "sub-objective")
of OSD is to become more accountable for the spending of
funds. Accountability in the DoD environment generally means
spending funds in such a way that Congress or the public will
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not believe that they could do a better job of it. For
example, if a news story exploits the fact that DoD spent $400
for a hammer, even if the following month DoD bought the same
hammer for half that price, it would not improve
accountability. The public wants to see each employee of the
DoD spending or obligating funds as if the funds were personal
funds of the employee.
One of the benefits of unit costing is that it
increases the visibility of cost drivers. However, it also
increases the visibility of all costs to Congress and the
public. Because of the constraints placed on DoD by outside
forces, particularly Congress, unit costs do not represent the
lowest cost possibly achievable. Instead, what they represent
is the lowest cost achievable within the constraints under
which DoD must operate. Consequently, unit costs for
functions that are also performed outside the DoD may appear
to be higher in comparison to industry prices. This may
appear unacceptable to taxpayers to whom the DoD must remain
accountable
.
Also, in the private sector, costs and prices are not
necessarily equal. Specifically, prices are not constrained
to equal average total costs (or unit costs) . Prices in the
private sector are determined by supply and demand and, if
necessary, firms will sell at a price lower than unit cost as
long as the price covers the marginal cost. If prices do not
cover average total costs, then the firm may go out of
business in the long run. However, market prices are not
constrained to equal average total costs in every period.
Thus, unit costs and market prices are directly comparable.
5. Cannot Determine Optimal Efficiency
While unit costs may be useful for measuring
incremental improvements in operational efficiency, they do
not indicate the point of optimal efficiency. Optimal
efficiency is achieved when the activity reaches the minimum
unit cost possible given its constraints. More detailed
knowledge of the cost curve of the organization would be
required to determine the optimal efficiency point. The cost
curve indicates how unit costs rise or fall given a certain
level of output. At lower levels of output, unit costs
decrease as the activity takes advantage of economies of
scale. However, after a certain point, economies os scale are
exploited and the unit cost increases as the level of output





Control systems are a necessary part of the managerial
environment. Properly designed control systems help ensure
the reliability of information that passes both up and down
the management hierarchy. They also help ensure the
accomplishment of desired actions. Control systems are
particularly valuable where the objectives of top-level
management and those of the lower level activities do not
coincide
.
One standard control system cannot meet the needs of all
organizations nor can one system satisfy the needs of any
organization at all points in time. As the organizational
environment changes or as the objectives of top-management
change, then so should the control system design.
Control system design within the federal government can be
challenging. As previously noted, there has been a history of
control problems within the federal agencies as reported by
GAO and attempts to solve the problems have not been
expedient. To compound the problem, control system design for
the federal government differs from control system design for
for-profit agencies. The main differences are that the
government lacks a profit measure and that it survives under
numerous constraints that prevent complete autonomy for
government actions.
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The current system must be analyzed before evaluating the
proposed control system. There are two primary reasons why a
control system might need to be changed. One reason is that
the organizational environment might have changed and the
other reason is that the existing controls may have been
ineffective at motivating the desired actions in the existing
environment
.
Currently, one of the primary reasons for changing the
control system definitely exists: the DoD environment has
changed . Defense budget authority is decelerating due to both
the political and economic climate, and world affairs. In
addition, the public is demanding more accountability for
government spending. However, until the current system is
evaluated using a control system framework, it cannot be
certain whether the system was ineffective (i.e. poorly
designed) or whether it was effective at achieving an
objective that is no longer valid.
Using a control framework introduced by K.A. Merchant, the
present system is evaluated by identifying key objectives and
key actions. The control system should be designed using
control tactics such that personnel are motivated to
accomplish the key actions and the activity reaches the key
objective. The key objective of the financial management
system under the current system is basically to obligate all
operations funds allocated to an activity.
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Consequently, the system concentrated on legally
obligating all funds before they were recouped and supporting
a budget request so the activity could meet all of its planned
requirements
.
Comparing the current system to the most feasible system
that could exist, given the key objective, key actions,' and
the DoD environment, the current system matches favorably. It
uses the right combination of personnel, results and actions
control to reach the objective of the organization. The one
weakness is that by using a results control to measure the net
obligation of funds, it may encourage activities to make less
than the optimal decision (with respect to getting the most
benefit for the funding available) in order to obligate the
funds before the end of the fiscal year.
The current system would not work in the new DoD
environment. The current system rewards spending whereas the
new key objective is for DoD to reduce costs. The new
emphasis is particularly focused on reducing the costs at all
support activities.
Part of the new control system design involves realigning
costs with outputs so that managers can understand precisely
the total cost of providing a service or product. Unit
costing provides the mechanism for this cost realignment. The
unit cost is a significant part of the control system because
it is a tool managers can use for making day-to-day cost-
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benefit decisions or for measuring operational efficiency
improvements
.
However, managers are still restricted and are not given
complete autonomy to reduce costs because of the other
policies and constraints placed on decision makers.
Government decision makers are often forced not to take a
cost-cutting avenue because legislation guidance requires them
to accept a higher cost alternative. For example, the
government must favor American-made products, American
produced coal for heating, small businesses , and minority-
owned businesses. Therefore, unit costs cannot be used as a
results measure in all places because of the outside
restrictions placed on managers.
Unit costing is also supposed to be used as a planning
tool in order to evaluate potential costs of projects or
policies. The more accurate the cost, the better the decision
will be whether to choose project A or B. In this case,
managers should reward the process of arriving at a realistic
unit cost and the process of making a good decision.
Unit costs cannot be used effectively as both a results
measure and a planning tool. As a results measure, unit costs
have the potential to be victims of a control system side-
effect called "gamesmanship." If activity managers believe
that their performance rating is based on a trendline showing
decreased unit costs period-to-period, then the motivation is
to "skew" those numbers in the favor of the activity. By
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artificially inflating the unit cost figures when the system
starts, the manager has slack resources he can "use up" in
order to decrease the unit cost in subsequent periods. An
activity can also smooth data by timing information such that
the trend indicates a constant, steady improvement rather than
a large amount of improvement one period and none the next
period.
The proposed system does not address the accountability
issue. By increasing the visibility of unit costs, it also
makes it more understandable to the public. While the public
may not be able to identify with the aggregate operational
cost for a fleet command, it may be able to identify with the
unit cost of laundering, training, housing, or providing
medical care for the servicemember . The public will be able
to make many comparisons between the unit cost of an item for
the DoD and a unit cost for the public. However, the unit cost
does not reflect the decisions that went into arriving at the
unit cost. The DOD places a premium value on having
sufficient inventory on hand for an emergency. The DoD also
places a premium value on keeping certain services within the
government (in-house operations) so that DoD can demand a
quick response. DoD will have to educate the public regarding
these issues if the DoD wants to remain accountable.
The new unit cost system is in its infancy stage and
changes will have to be made to the control system as it
matures. It would be prudent for DoD to concentrate on the
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personnel controls, because of the questionable effect that
results control will have on motivating managers. DoD could
increase the potential for a successful transition to the new
system by communicating system changes (and desired actions)
to employees and by providing training on implementation.
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